| 舒丽瑰.集体经济的监管困境与基层选举差异——以东部地区为例[J].井冈山大学社科版,2020,41(2):90-96 |
| 集体经济的监管困境与基层选举差异——以东部地区为例 |
| Supervision Dilemma in Collective Economy and Difference of Grass-roots Election in Eastern Rural Areas-Cases Study on Grass-root Election in Southern Jiangsu, Pearl River Delta and Zhejiang Province |
| 投稿时间：2019-10-18 |
| DOI：10.3969/j.issn.1674-8107.2020.02.012 |
| 中文关键词: 集体土地开发 集体资产权归属 竞争性选举 区域差异 |
| 英文关键词: collective land development ownership of collective assets regional differences competitive election |
| 基金项目:国家社科基金青年项目“基于小农户需求的农业社会化服务的内生性发展路径研究”（项目编号：18BSH040）。 |
|
| 摘要点击次数: 1580 |
| 全文下载次数: 1921 |
| 中文摘要: |
| 同是东部经济发达村庄，同样村集体经济发达，苏南、珠三角及浙江农村的村庄选举秩序却差异较大。研究发现，集体资产管理中的代理人监督问题是东部基层选举秩序差异的关键变量。制度设计上，集体资产管理制度中内含代理人监督困境。这给村干部身份预留利益空间，易引发选举竞争。苏南农村的集体资产分配中嵌入了乡镇监督，村干部开支—上级审核，代理人被监控起来，获利空间缺乏，村庄选举竞争不激烈；珠三角农村的集体资产分配中嵌入了村民监督，村干部开支—群众审议，代理人处于监督之中，获利空间透明，村庄选举竞争不激烈；浙江农村的集体资产分配中缺乏监督，村干部开支—村干部审议，代理人缺乏监控，获利空间具备，村庄选举竞争激烈。获利空间是刺激农户主动参与村庄选举的原因。一旦利益减弱，群众选举热情就会下降，基层民主政治就会面临一致性的弱竞争困境。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| In spite of the same developed collective economy in eastern rural areas, the grass-root election orders reflect different features in the Southern Jiangsu, Pearl River Delta and Zhejiang province. Our study shows that agent supervision in collective assets becomes a key variable in the grass-roots election orders. In the system design level, the village collective assets management system is facing a dilemma of agent supervision, which leaves benefits space for the village cadres running for the election. In the rural areas of Southern Jiangsu, the township government supervision to the agent left little benefit space with of the township government in the management of village collective assets, which induces less severe competition in the grass-roots election. In rural areas of Pearl River Delta, the villagers' supervision to the agent also leaves transparent benefit space with the expenses of village cadres under the villagers' supervision, which induces less severe competition in the grass-roots election as well. However, in the rural areas of Zhejiang, there is no supervision to agent with the expense of the village cadre under the supervision of themselves, which induces severe competition in the grass-root election for the considerable benefits in the management of village collective assets. Farmers run for the election owing to economic interests. Once interests decrease, villagers' enthusiasm to participate in village politics will also fade. Therefore, village democratic politics will face a weak competition dilemma. |
|
查看全文
查看/发表评论 下载PDF阅读器 |
| 关闭 |
